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Summary 
Recent European Legislation on immigration has revealed a particular paradox on 
migration policies. On the one hand, the trend of recent legislation points to the 
increasing closure of frontiers (OECD 1999, 2001,2004), also by using immigration 
quotas. On the other hand, there is an increase of regularization, i.e., European policies 
are becoming less tight. Our aim here is to study these counterbalanced and opposite 
policies in European immigration legislation in a unified framework . To do this, we 
have used a real option approach to migration choice that assumes that the decision to 
migrate can be described as an irreversible investment decision where quotas represent 
an upper bound limit. Our results show that the paradox of counterbalancing 
immigration policies is not odd but it could be in line with an optimal policy to control 
migration inflow. In particular, we show that if the government controls the information 
related to the immigration quota system it could delay the mass entry of immigrants 
maintaining, in the long run, the required immigration stock and controlling the flows in 
the short-run. 
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While barriers to international trade and capital mobility have been largely re-
moved, labour markets are still the most tightly regulated areas of economic
activity (Faini et al., 1999). In this respect, Boeri and Brücker (2005), studying
European migration, showed that rules for legal immigration into the EU from
third countries are getting tighter and tighter: "since 1990 there have been 92
reforms of national migration policies in to the EU-15, that is, more than ﬁve
reforms per year. Most of these reforms are marginal in that they adjust speciﬁc
provisions rather than revising the overall regulatory framework. Furthermore,
seven reforms out of ten tighten regulations, for example, by increasing proce-
dural obstacles faced by those applying for visas, reducing the duration of work
permits or making family reuniﬁcation more diﬃcult", or by introducing an im-
migration quota system1. In particular, this latter immigration policy has been
adopted by certain European countries (Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, Spain, UK) to control migration inﬂow better and was suggested at the
meeting of the EU Justice and Home Aﬀairs ministers in Stratford-upon-Avon
in late October 2006 2. Nevertheless, despite this evidence, another aspect re-
lated to migration policy has revealed a peculiar paradox of migration policies.
Since 1990, there have been 26 (39 since 1973) one-shot regularization programs
in 10 EU countries (Jachimowicz et al., 2004; Sunderhaus, 2007)3. Therefore,
on one hand as a result of increased labour market competition and concerns
about terrorism the trend of recent legislation over immigration points to in-
creased closure of frontiers (OECD 1999, 2001). On the other hand, there are
more regolarization programs which, as anticipated by the immigrants, relax
the eﬀect of immigration quotas and make the European policies less tightened.
Therefore, what kind of policy is best to control immigration? As many
countries have adopted simultaneously two kinds of opposite immigration poli-
cies, at a ﬁrst glance, it seems that the legislator has no clear idea of what
kind of policy is best to control immigration. Our aim in this paper is to an-
swer this question, by investigating the counterbalancing immigration policies
in European immigration legislation in an uniﬁed framework.
By using a recent approach to migration choice that assumes that the de-
cision to migrate can be described as an investment decision (Sjaastad, 1962),
we have approached the above question by extending recent results obtained
by Bartolini4 (1993; 1995). Bartolini shows that a competitive market reacts to
limit5 aggregate investment by generating recurrent runs as the total investment
approches its limit. That is, the existence of quotas on aggregate investment
may induce endogenous and recurrent asset runs so that the quotas are imme-
diately ﬁlled. In the speciﬁc, the aggregate investment evolves smoothly over
time, driven by market conditions, until it reaches an upper threshold where it
shows a jump that ﬁlls the quotas.
We shows that introducing some uncertainty over the quota in a competitive
migration market, the entry run tends to vanish. As each agent is not able to
perfectly foresee the real quota, he acts as the quota did not exist. The entry
process tends to be smooth and has no jumps. The ambiguity over the true
quota reduces the entry runs by potential immigrants, allowing the government
to obtain, in the long run, the required immigration stock and to control ﬂow
in the short-run. In this context, the presence of regolarization programs that
make the agents unable to perfectly foresee the real quota is not any more a
paradox, but it could be useful for the planner to control immigration inﬂow.
This paper is related to past research that applies the real option approach
to migration phenomena. In this respect, Burda (1995), showed that individuals
prefer to wait before migrating, even if the present value of the wage diﬀeren-
2tial is positive, because of the uncertainty and the sunk costs associated with
migration. Subsequently Khwaja (2002) and Anam et al., (2007) developed
Burda’s approach by describing the role of uncertainty in the migration deci-
sion. Another work that uses real option in migration is Feist (1998), in which
the author analyses the option value of the low-skilled workers to escape to
the unoﬃcial sector if welfare beneﬁts come too close to the net wage in the
oﬃcial sector. Three recent papers (Moretto and Vergalli, 2008; Vergalli, 2007;
Vergalli, 2008) applied the real option framework to the analysis of migration
dynamics, focussing on the role of communities and network to explain mass
migration.
In the ﬁrst part, we describe what happens in migration dynamics if the
authority imposes a determined and known quota on the immigration entries.
In the second part, we show that the introduction of noise over the quota system
delays mass entry. This uncertainty can be created either by announcing poli-
cies followed by diﬀerent action by the government or by introducing diﬀerent
policies relaxing or tightening the conditions to immigrate. In both the cases
this uncertainty could also depend on governments with unstable majorities,
that probably is expressed in counterbalancing migration policies. This fact
could also explain why recent legislation on immigration moves towards the two
counterbalancing directions explained above: this ambiguity related to quotas
and regularization programs could increase expecially in countries with unsta-
ble majorities. The result is that in this case, the migration inﬂow becomes
smooth independent of the particular policy adopted. Indeed, as stressed in the
OECD International Migration Outlook (2006), "In practice, however, the na-
tional limits and associated quotas have been less than the numbers requested
by employers and have proven to be signiﬁcantly under actual labour market
needs, if the extent of regularisations of persons with employment contracts is
any indication [...] the regular lack of concordance between the programmed
migration levels and labour market needs meant that in practice, the levels had
become almost irrelevant. Employers may well have become accustomed to a
situation in which they could hire outside legal channels with relative impunity,
with a reasonable probability that the hiring would be formally recognised a
few years hence through regularisation".
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 summarises the evolution of
national immigration policies. Section 3 presents the model and the basic as-
sumptions. Section 4 develops the theoretical framework with known quota.
Section 5 develops the theoretical framework with unknown quota and the main
results. Section 6 summarises the conclusions. Finally, the Appendix contains
the proofs omitted in the text.
2 Evolution in National Immigration Policies
Immigration policies could be tightened by using diﬀerent criteria. In this re-
spect, Boeri and Brücker (2005) developed an aggregate policy index that de-
scribes "the trend in migration policies". The index is obtained by taking the
average of the following seven indicators: 1) admission requirements; 2) number
of administrations involved; 3) lenghth of ﬁrst stay; 4) quotas; 5) residence re-
quirement; 6) years to obtain a permanent permit; 7) asylum policy6. According
to their analysis the national immigration policies are becoming more tighten7.
There is no doubt that all these seven policies are the mirror of European im-
migration policy. Nevertheless, for some of these policies we should distinguish
between short and long term eﬀects also between their eﬀects on migration ﬂow
and/or migration stocks. For example, let us consider the admission require-
3ments and immigration quotas: a government, in order to control both stock
and ﬂow simultaneously in line with government legislation (this tightening re-
duces migration inﬂow) then, the eﬀect of a quota is ambiguous: that is, on one
hand the quotas may be able to control migration stocks in the long run, on the
other hand they can trigger oﬀ some run-entry mechanisms that could defeat
any control of inﬂow and its speed. That is, quotas are useful to control, at
least in the long run, the total number of immigrants (stock) but not the entry
speed (ﬂow). Moreover, this eﬀect is stronger when the quota is perceived by the
immigrants as the last chance to enter: they all hurry to enter the host country.
In table 1 we show the European countries that have recently introduced this
kind of policy, being Austria, Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal,
Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom8.
Country  Quota  Source 
Austria  •  In 1990, a quota for the employment of foreigners was introduced, defined as 
a maximum share of foreign workers in the total workforce. 
•  The Residence Act 1993 has the objective to control immigration . It defines 
the quantitative and qualitative criteria for the potential residence of different 
groups of foreigners: definition of quotas for certain sub-groups of 
immigrants (family members). 
•  The Aliens Law 1997 (Fremdengesetz ) came into effect in 1998. It regulates 
the conditions for entry and residence in the country. The key concept of the 
reform is: "Integration Before New Immigration". Reduction of immigration 
quotas. 
•  The Aliens Law 2002 changes the conditions of entry and residence in the 
country, it provides for a stricter system of immigration control and it tightens 
the quota system. Key professional are not subject to quotas, don't have to 
fulfill the integration agreement and can obtain a residence permit with the 
authorization to work. 
 
Federal Ministry for Internal Affairs,  
Migration Information Source,  
European Migration Network,  
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 
Czech 
Republic 
•  The Czech government launched in 2002 a pilot programme for the active 
selection of the qualified foreign workers. The quotas were established for the 
first two years – 600 and 1200 persons for 2003 and 2004 respectively 
OECD 
France  •  In 2006, the government has been required to submit to parliament an annual 
report specifying the number and kind of residency permits to be authorized 
over a three-year period. The draft bill avoids using the word "quotas," but 
critics say the provision amounts to a quota-system”. 
•  In 2007 the government decided to adopt decrees on immigration quotas “by 
profession, category and, naturally, by regions of the world” 
Work Permits 
Greece  •  The Law 1975/1991 defines for the  first time the legal situation of migrants 
and refugees. It's an attempt to modernize the relevant legislation on issues of 
entrance, exit, stay, settlement, employment and expulsion of aliens.  
•  The Law 2910/2001 reorganizes the procedure concerning work permits: the 
Manpower Employment Organization at the end of every year prepares a report 
recording the current needs in Greek labour market, a resolution based on this 
report shall set forth the maximum number of work permits to be granted every 
year. 
European Migration Network 
Italy  •  The Law 39/1990 (Martelli Law) regulates the entry and the residence of non-
EU citizens: migration begins to be considered as a stable phenomenon. The 
law defines the conditions to grant entry permits for working reasons: the 
Government has to draw up a yearly plan instead of referring to pre-defined 
criteria. This is the first law that bruits the idea of quotas. 
•  With ministry of Employment’s decree 15 February 2006, were defined the 
non-EU immigrant quotas. 
European Migration Network, 
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 





Portugal  •  The Decree-Law 34/2003 introduces a system of quotas to regulate the entry of 
migrants. Every year, depending on economic and labour market condition, the 
maximum number of foreigners allowed to enter the country is fixed by the 
Government. 
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 
Slovenia  •  The Employment and Work of Aliens Act is the main act regulating the 
economic migration in Slovenia. It sets the policy priorities as well as the 
maximum quotas of admitted workers 
OECD 
Spain  •  The quota system is the basic mechanism used in managing the labour 
immigration in Spain. 
It was used in the years 1993-1995, 1997-1999 and since 2002. The aim of the 
quotas was to direct the immigrants to the labour market sectors which suffered 
from shortages. 
Migration Information Surce, 
Fondazione Rodolfo De Benedetti 
Sopemi - OECD 
Switzerland  •  The Swiss government relaxed its immigration laws on 01 June 2007. Quotas 
will remain in place for these countries until at least 2011. The previous system 
allowed 15,000 permanent residence permits to be granted annually for people 
who had a job contract for more than one year. This quota was quickly 
exhausted each year. Short term permits, allocated at 115,000 per year, were 




For unskilled workers: 
•  Working Holiday Makers – around 46,000 young people from 
Commonwealth countries (17-27 years old) are allowed to come to Britain 
and take up non-professional job for up to 2 years; 
•  seasonal agricultural workers – for students, mainly form Central and Eastern 
Europe, who arrive within a set quota (Food Manufacturing Fish and Meat 
sector in the context of Sector Based Scheme Pemits); 
•  Au pairs – around 15,000 per annum; 
•  Domestic workers – around 15,000 per annum (Spencer 2002). 
Work Permits, World Bank, OECD 
 
Table 1: immigration quota system adopted in some countries
To be complete in the analysis of migration policies, we must also add an-
other instrument that governments can use to control migration: regularization
programs which by deﬁnition, relax the eﬀect of immigration quotas and modify
at the same time immigrant ﬂow and stocks. So, looking at European legislation,
4it is possible to see that several countries impose both admission requirements
and quotas to reduce entry. Nevertheless, they also adopt frequent regulariza-
tion programs. In Table 2 we can see the programs adopted in Europe since
19739. Since 1990, there have been 26 (39 since 1973) one-shot regularization
programs in 10 EU countries.
Country  Regularizations  Years 
Belgium  3  1974-1975, 1995-1999, 2000 
France  5  1973, 1979, 1981-1982, 1991, 1997-1998 
Germany  2  1996, 1999 
Greece  2 1997-1998,  2001 
Italy  6  1982, 1987-1988, 1990, 1996, 1998-1999, 2002 
Luxembourg  1 2001 
Netherlands  5  1964, 1975, 1978-1979, 1991-1994, 1996 
Portugal  3  1992-1993, 1996, 2001 
Spain  7  1985-1986, 1991, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2005 
United Kingdom  5  1974-1978, 1977, 1987, 1998-1999, 2004 
Total  39  
 
Table 2: Regularization Programs in 10 EU countries.
3 The Model
3.1 The basic assumptions
For simplicity, the model uses the familiar terminology of an agents’ entry deci-
sions under uncertainty10. Consider the immigration decision of individuals in
a host country subject to an uncertain wage gap. Let us summarize the main
assumptions:
1. At any time t, a potential immigrant may decide to migrate ("entry").
Individuals are risk-neutral and discount the future income at the constant
discount rate ρ.
2. Each individual can migrate by committing irrevocably to a ﬂow cost w
or undertaking a single irreversible investment which requires an initial
sunk cost K = w/ρ.
3. nt is the number of individuals that are in the host country at time t,e a c h
yields a ﬂow of income11:
π(θt,n t) ≡ u(nt)θt (1)
where θ is a multiplicative labour market-speciﬁcs h o c k .W ec a nc o n s i d e r ,
in a simpler setting, u(nt) as the inverse demand function (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994, ch. 9; Bartolini, 1993; Nielsen, 2002) or as a reduced form
of a more general beneﬁt function (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, ch. 11; Dixit,
1995; Grenadier, 2002; Moretto and Vergalli 2008). Time is continuous,
t ∈ [0,∞), and suppressed if not necessary.
4. The function u(n) is continuously diﬀerentiable in n with the usual prop-
erties.
u(n) > 0,u 0(n) < 0
lim
n→0
u(n)=+ ∞ and lim
n→ ¯ N
u(n)=u > 0
5where ¯ N ≤∞ can be interpreted as the upper saturation level of the
ethnic community in the host country12. So, a positive reserve "utility" u
means that for each immigrant the beneﬁts from migration (even in the
worst case) are higher than the costs (in the wider sense) to migrate.13
5. All individuals are identical and their size dnt is inﬁnitesimally small with
respect to the labour market in the host country.
6. The labour market-speciﬁc shock follows a geometric diﬀusion process14:
dθt = αθtdt + σθtdWt with θ0 = θ and α,σ > 0 (2)
where α<ρand dWt is the increment to a Wiener process, satisfying
E(dWt)=0and Va r(dWt)=dt15.
In the next section, we assume that the quota is known to the immigrants.
The existence of a limit on the aggregate level of migration induces an externality
among the beneﬁt functions of diﬀerent immigrants, which causes a possible
divergence between the socially-optimal and proﬁt-maximizing policies. Then,
in section 4 we will relax this assumption, by assuming that the immigrants
m i g h tu n k n o w nt h et r u eq u o t a .
3 . 2 S o l u t i o nw i t hd e ﬁned quota
For the ﬁr s tr e s u l tw eh a v ea d d e dt h ef o l l o w i n ga s s u m p t i o n :
7. There exists an exogenous determined quota N<¯ N on n, which is an-
nounced by the government and is known to all the potential immigrants.
To determine the migrant’s optimal entry policy, the ﬁrst thing to do is to
ﬁnd his/her value given each individual’s optimal future entry policy. Let us
consider the value of an immigrant V (θ,n,N), that is active in the market, as
the expected discounted stream of income:




e−ρtπ(θt,n t)dt − J[t=τ]K | n0 = n, θ0 = θ
¸
(3)
where J[t=τ] is the indicator function and the expectation is taken considering
that the number of active immigrants may change over time by new entry. The
solution to (3) can be obtained starting within a time interval within which no
new entry occurs. Over this interval the number of immigrants n is ﬁxed and
V (θ,n,N), must satisfy the no-arbitrage requirement16 where time is suppressed
if not necessary:
π(θ,n)+E[dV (θ,n,N)/dt]=ρV (θ,n,N) (4)
Assuming V (θ,n,N) to be a twice-diﬀerentiable function with respect to θ
and using Itô’s Lemma to expand dV (θ,n,N), the solution of (3) is given by
the following diﬀerential equation (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 179-180):17
1
2
σ2Vθθ (θ,n,N)+αVθ (θ,n,N) − ρV (θ,n,N)+π (θ,n)=0 (5)











represents the value of migration in the absence
of new entry18,t h e nB (n,N)θ
β is the correction of the migration’s value due
to the new entry and B (n,N) must therefore be negative. Obviously, a last
boundary condition applies to the value of the Nth entry. The value of the
Nth entry should converge to the value of a migration calculated by keeping the
number of immigrants ﬁxed at N, i.e. V (θ,n,N)=
θu(N)
ρ−α . This implies that:
B (N,N)=0 . (7)
If the beneﬁt value function (6) is known, the optimal migration policy
implies that the return from migration must be at least equal to cost K at
the entry point. In other words, we need to ﬁnd the trigger value θ
∗ (n) (i.e.
the value of the labour demand shock) at which the nth migrant is indiﬀerent
between immediate entry or waiting another instant. This trigger should be
calculated bearing in mind that N is the upper limit oltre il quale nessuna altra
entrata è consentita.19 This is deﬁned in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The beneﬁt-maximizing entry policy in a market with a quota








for n=( 0 ,n ∗] (8)
θ
∗(n∗)=θ
∗(N) for n=[ n∗,N] (9)
where θ
∗(N)=( ρ − α) K
u(N).
Proof. See Bartolini (1993) and the Appendix.
By Proposition 1, the entry policy is eﬃcient until a number n∗ <Nof
individuals have entered the market. At that point a migration run takes place
and the residual quota is instantly ﬁlled. As proved by Bartolini (1993), n∗ is
determined by the fact that it splits the interval (0,N] into two subintervals. In
the ﬁrst interval, the individuals enter by following the usual matching value and
smooth pasting conditions, i.e. V (θ




dn > 0 (see the Appendix) ; in the second interval, the individuals
migrate by a "run" until the whole quota is instantly ﬁlled, i.e.
dθ∗(n)
dn =0 ,







The insights from Proposition 1 are shown in Figure 1, below. In particular:
i) In the ﬁrst quadrant on the left, on the abscissa, there is the entry value for
diﬀerent θ and n levels. The migration value of the ﬁrst n∗ immigrants
follows the S-shaped curve typical of model of investment hysteresis (Dixit
and Pindyck, 1994, p. 220). These curves are tangential to the barrier
(i.e., the entry cost) K and describe the value of migration as long as it
ﬂuctuates under the K level. The last (N − n∗) curves cross the level K,
and all of them must cross K at the same level of fundamentals θ.20 When-
ever V (θ,n,N) reaches K, the number of immigrants increases, shifting
the current curve rightward. When n reaches n∗, a large change in n shifts
t h ec u r r e n tc u r v ef r o mV (θ,n∗,N) to V (θ,N,N).
ii) The second quadrant on the right shows the threshold levels for diﬀerent
numbers of immigrants. Below or to the right of the curve no migration
7occurs because at a given level θ(n) <θ
∗ (n), the beneﬁtf o re a c hp o t e n t i a l
immigrant is lower than the cost faced to migrate. This means that above
the curve it is optimal to migrate. A wave of migrants will enter in a
lump to move the beneﬁt level immediately to the threshold curve. In the
region below the curve the optimal policy is inaction. But the shock can
cross the trigger for diﬀerent numbers of individuals, n. To appreciate
the explanation of Figure 1, let us consider a sequential entry starting at
n<n ∗. If the initial size of the community is n<n ∗, we can expect
migration to work in the following way. For any ﬁxed n, if the beneﬁts
climb to a certain level π∗ = u(n)θ
∗(n), migration becomes feasible, the
network size increases from n to n + dn and the beneﬁts go downward
along the function u(n).21 If the size of the community is n∗ ≤ n ≤ N,
when the shock hits the threshold θ
∗(n), then the quota is instantaneously
ﬁlled and a mass (N − n) of individuals enter and the beneﬁts climb to
π∗ = u(N)θ
∗(N). Therefore, until n∗ the individuals migrate in a smooth
manner, but between n∗ and N they enter in a mass because for (N−n∗),
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Figure 1: Optimal threshold levels with known quota N
Summarizing, with free entry, labour market competition generates a run
that ﬁlls the quota when a fraction n∗/N has been ﬁlled. Until then, the entry
policy is identical to the case without a quota. Immigrants initially enter at the
optimal pace, knowing that all the potential beneﬁts will dissipated by the early
entry of the last (N − n∗) individuals.
4 Solution with undetermined quota
So far we have analysed the optimal policy with a ﬁxed-known quota on the
number of individuals allowed to enter in the host country, but what happens
if the limit were perceived to be uncertain by immigrants? To introduce uncer-
tainty over the quota, we replace assumption (7) with the following assumption:
7b i s .Each individual does not know the exact limit over the stock imposed
by the government22. However he/she knows that the quota is con-
tinuously distributed and drawn from a common distribution function
8F(N)=P r ( N <N ) which is strictly increasing on the interval [0, ¯ N],
where ¯ N is the upper support of the distribution of N, and it has a con-
tinuous diﬀerentiable density f(N)23.
Further, we assume that each individual makes rational conjectures about
the distribution of N over time. More speciﬁcally, as new individuals decide
to migrate, the individual will update his/her conjecture about Pr(N <N ).
As time goes by and n increases the potential immigrant learns that the prob-
abilty of hitting the quota is higher. The individual then observes the real-
ization of the state variable n and updates its conjecture by using G(N;n)=
Pr(N <N) |N>n )=
F(N)−F(n)
1−F(n) which is strictly increasing on the interval
[n,∞), with density g(N;n)=
f(N)
1−F(n).
Since now the individuals do not know the true quota, the value of their
decision cannot be deﬁned by (6). In particular, the last boundary condition




E (B (n)) = 0 (11)
where the expectation operator is taken with respect to the random variable N .
As before, also in this case, we should ﬁnd the threshold level θ
∗ (n) that
corresponds to the optimal entry process. Taking into account condition (11),
we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 The beneﬁt-maximizing entry policy in a market with an un-
















for all n>n ∗∗ (13)
where n∗ <n ∗∗.
Proof. see the Appendix.
Proposition 2 states that the entry policy is eﬃcient until a number n∗∗
of immigrants has entered the market. At that point, a migration run starts
until the true (unknown) quota is reached. That is, since the true quota is
unknown, the migration run continues until the government stops entries since
the predeﬁned limit has been reached. In addition, by looking at (12) and (13)
it is evident that the optimal trigger n∗∗ is obtained by considering all support
of the distribution F(N), i.e., each individual acts as if the quota did not exist







nally, by direct inspection of (10) and (14), it is immediate obvious that n∗∗ <n ∗
as long as u(N) >u .
To interprete these results, let us look at Figure 2. In particular, in the
quadrant on the left we have the value of the immigrants on the horizontal axis
and the threshold level on the vertical axis. In the quadrant on the right, we
have the threshold level on the vertical axis and the number of immigrants in
the host country on the horizontal axis. The red line represents the optimal
trigger as a function of the number of immigrants. By comparing Figure 1 and
9Figure 2, we can see that while, without uncertainty, the optimal threshold level
ﬂattens at n∗, under uncertainty the competitive run starts at n∗∗ >n ∗ and
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Figure 2: Optimal threshold levels with unknown quota
If diﬀerent political parties alternate in the government of a country, they
probably express diﬀerent policies. In particular they probably have diﬀerent
and counterbalancing migration policies. This ambiguity related to quotas and
regularization programs could increase expecially in countries with unstable
majorities. The result is that in this case, the migration inﬂow becomes smooth
independent of the particular policy adopted.
A policy remark about this result is in order. Comparing the two rules







which means that the ratio between n∗∗ and n∗, does not depend on the distri-
bution of the quota F(N) but only on the ratio between u and u(N). If adopting
repeated regularization programs a country is able to generate noise over the
true quota N, and to install the idea in the immigrants that the labour market’s
saturation level might increase, the entry jump is moved forward. That is, the
entry run happens at a higher size n∗∗, corresponding to a higher beneﬁt level
u(n∗∗)θ
∗(n∗∗), which means that the quota is fullﬁlled later. In other words, if
the government’s aim is to delay migration waves and smoothing entries, it can
do it by controlling informations regarding the immigration quota.
5T h e e ﬀect of labour market uncertainty
Our model allows for a deeper study of the eﬀect of uncertainty over labour
demand on entry policy as well as on the optimal triggers n∗ and n∗∗.F r o m












As anticipated by the Real Option Theory, an increase in the labour demand
volatility (σ) increases the
β
β−1 ratio which, in turn, rises the threshold of θ
∗ (n)
for any given number of immigrants n. In this sense, greater uncertainty implies
less willingness to migrate. However, as shown by (17), greater uncertainty
magniﬁes the competitive eﬀect, reducing the size that triggers the entry run.
Therefore, depending on what kind of eﬀects prevails, we may get two entry
p a t t e r n sa ss h o w ni nF i g u r e3 . 25 If the uncertainty eﬀect is soft, then the
competition eﬀect, coming from a decrease of the crucial level n∗∗0 <n ∗∗ is
stronger than the entry delay caused by the raise of the threshold level (lower
bold dotted line in ﬁgure). Entry is pushed forward because of the decrease of
competition and, although we experiment a reduction of immigration ﬂow, the
average time to reach the government’s predeﬁned limit can be substanzially
reduced. On the contrary, if the eﬀect of uncertainty is strong, the time delay of
migration entry (higher bold dotted line in ﬁgure) is stronger than the reduction
of competition: in this case there is a reduction of migration inﬂow and an





































Figure 3. Undetermined quota: threshold levels for increasing variance
6C o n c l u s i o n
Recent European legislation on immigration reveals a peculiar paradox on mi-
gration policies. On one hand, as a result of increased labour market competition
and concerns about terrorism, the trend of recent legislation over immigration
points to increasing frontier closure (OECD 1999, 2001). From the other, there
is an increase of regolarization, that is the European policies become less tight-
ened. We have tackled these counterbalancing and opposite policies by using
a real option approach for migration choice that assumes that the decision to
migrate can be described as an irreversible investment decision (Burda, 1995;
Moretto and Vergalli, 2008). The ﬁrst result agrees with economic literature
(Bartolini, 1993) and shows that if a government imposes a quota over the mi-
gration stock, the potential immigrant rushes towards the host country because
11they are afraid of being left out. If, however a government is ambiguous about
the quota system, that is, alternating a tightening of admission requirements
and quotas to regularization programs, it can delay the mass entry of immi-
grants. If this is the case then the counterbalancing immigration policies used
by European countries is not so odd. It could be useful to indirectly delay mi-
gration waves. Moreover, if certain governments have unstable majorities, that
probably is expressed in counterbalancing migration policies, the migration in-
ﬂow could become smooth independent of the particular policy adopted, but,
also as a consequence of this political ambiguity. Furthermore, if a goverment’s
aim is to delay entry migration waves, it could control it by causing noise on
information relating to immigration quotas. In conclusion, between the two
policies adopted (tightening or reducing the rules for legal immigration) there
exists a third policy that is to alternate tightening and reduction in order to
create uncertainty over the quota system that may help to control entry better.
12A Proof of proposition 1
A family of solutions of (5) is given by:
V (θ,n,N)=A(n,N)θ
γ + B (n,N)θ
β + ˆ V (θ,n) (18)





λ(λ − 1) + αλ − ρ =0with 1 <β<
ρ
α and A(n,N) and B(n,N)
are the two families of integration constants; ˆ V (θ,n) is chosen as the discounted













Because the probability of entry tends to zero as θ tends to zero, one boundary
condition is that lim
θ→0







in the text. The coeﬃcient B (n,N) can be determined by using the following
suitable set of boundary conditions:
1. First, by competitive pressure, the value-matching condition requires the
value of being entered is equal to the entry cost K at θ = θ
∗ (n), i.e.,




2. Second, as long as each individual rationally forecasts the future develop-
ment of the whole market and new entries by competitors at the optimal




3. Third, on (6) for n = N<¯ N, yields (8) and B(N,N)=0 .



















This smooth pasting condition states that either each individual exercises its
entry option at the level of θ at which the value is tangent to the entry cost,
i.e., Vθ (θ
∗,n,N)=0 , or the optimal trigger θ
∗(n) does not change with n.
While the former means that the value function is smooth at entry and the
trigger is a continuous function of n, the latter indicates that an individual
would beneﬁt from marginally anticipating or delaying its entry decision. In
particular if Vθ (θ
∗,n,N) < 0 it means that the value of migrate is expected to
increase if θ drops. On the contrary if Vθ (θ
∗,n,N) > 0 means that an individual
would expect to make losses versus a future drop in θ. In both situations (23)
is satisﬁed by imposing ∂θ∗
∂n =0 .

















ρ−α > 0, then (24) cannot hold at n = N.T h e r e -
fore, it must be (25) that hold at n = N and by (21):
θ




Now, deﬁne n∗ as the largest n ≤ N that satisﬁes (24). For all n∗ ≤ n ≤ N,
we have
∂θ∗(n)
∂n =0 , so that all immigrants in the range [n∗,N] must enter at
θ
∗(N). In addition, since for the range n<n ∗ (24) holds, applying this to the


















=( ρ − α)
K
u(N)
Let us now demonstrate the uniqueness of n∗. First, by B (N,N)=0 ,a t
N, V(θ,N,N) equals the discounted income stream with beneﬁt ﬁxed at u(N):




Then, to obtain B(n,N), substitute (20) into (22): Bn(n,N)=−(θ
∗)
1−β u0 (n)/(ρ−
α) and integrating between n and N,g i v e s :
Z N
n












β (ρ − α)
£
uβ (N) − uβ (n)
¤
< 0 (30)
with limn→N B (n,N)=0 −. Substituting (30) into (23), we can deﬁne the










uβ (N) − uβ (n)
¤
(31)
with H (N) > 0.I fH is still positive for a N−y (where y may be inﬁnitesimally
small), with π∗
θ∗ = u(N) we ought to obtain dθ∗
dn =0 . This procedure continues
until we obtain y∗ (deﬁned by n∗ = N − y∗) such that H (n∗)=0 . Let us take











βuβ−1 (N − y)u0(N − y) (32)
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∗ )1−ββuβ−1 (N − y) − 1
¸
=
u0 (N − y)
ρ − α
£
(u(N))1−ββuβ−1 (N − y) − 1
¤
=









Q.E.D. (Quod erat demonstrandum) if y increases (moving from N to 0)
t h e r ee x i s t sav a l u eo fn∗ (i.e. y∗) such that H (n∗)=0 .
B Proof of Proposition 2.
With uncertainty over stock N, equation (30) becomes:
E (B (n)) =
π∗1−β
β (ρ − α)
"Z ¯ N
n












which is negative because it worth uβ (n) >u β (N) for any N>n .Furthermore,
the limit of E (B (n)), yields:
lim
n→ ¯ N
E (B (n)) =
π∗1−β
















β (ρ − α)
£
uβ (n) − uβ (n)
¤
=0 −
which is consistent with (11).26


























ρ−α > 0 which requires that dθ∗
dn =0 27.
For the uniqueness of n∗∗, assuming that E
¡
H
¡ ¯ N − y
¢¢
> 0 so that dθ∗
dn =0
and the optimal trigger is π∗
θ∗ = u, we need to show that d
E(H( ¯ N−y))
dy < 0.
Substituting ¯ N − y into (34), we get:
E(H












¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dx
1 − F( ¯ N − y)





















−uβ ¡ ¯ N − y
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f( ¯ N − y)(1 − F( ¯ N − y) −
R ¯ N
¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))2
+βuβ−1 ¡ ¯ N − y
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f( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y)
−
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¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))2 + βuβ−1 ¡ ¯ N − y
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uβ ¡ ¯ N − y
¢
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(1 − F( ¯ N − y))
−
R ¯ N
¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf(∞−y)
























uβ ¡ ¯ N − y
¢
f( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))
−
R ¯ N
¯ N−y uβ (x)f(x)dxf( ¯ N − y)
(1 − F( ¯ N − y))2
⎤
⎦ < 0
Then, there exists a value n∗∗ = ¯ N − y∗∗ such that E(H (n∗∗)) = 0.
Finally we need to show that n∗∗ <n ∗. To do this we need to show two
conditions:
1. The value of H(N − y) is greater than the value of E[H( ¯ N − y)] for any
y>y ∗.
2. The function (34) increases more rapidily than (31), i.e., the derivative
(32) is greater than (35).
Condition 2 combined with condition 1 implies that the two functions do
not intersect and that there exists a y∗∗ such that E[H( ¯ N − y∗∗)] = 0. For the
ﬁrst condition, stressing the analysis with respect to any point y greater than
y∗, we can show that (34) evaluated at N − y (i.e. assuming N as the upper
limit of the stock) is lower than (31) if and only if:
R N
N−y uβ (x)f(x)dx
1 − F(N − y)
< 0
that follows using the neoclassical properties. For the second condition, com-




E(H (N − y))
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Figure 3: Graphic Solution
17Notes
1A" q u o t a "i sd e ﬁned as the share of a total immigrants that is assigned to a particular
group. In this paper the term "quota" is in line with SOPEMI International Migration Outlook
(2006) and it is foregone in favour of terms that more precisely describe the nature of numerical
migration level, such as "target level", "numerical limit", the maximum and "cap".
2"Schäuble-Sarkozy suggested that EU asylum policy should be centralised, that long-term
economic immigration should be managed by quotas and that short-term immigration should
be regulated by temporary visas", Editorial of Intereconomics, (2006).
3In their broadest sense, regularization programs oﬀer those migrants who are in a country
without authorization the opportunity to legalize their status.
Irregular migrants, also referred to as "undocumented," "unauthorized," or "illegal," are
deﬁned by most states as those migrants who have either entered a country legally and then
fallen out of legal status – such as students, temporary workers, rejected asylum seekers, or
tourists – or those who have entered illegally, either by crossing a border undetected or with
false documents. In either case, irregular migrants do not have a legal right to residence in
the state to which they have migrated.
4Bartolini (1993, 1995), develops a general model that considers the investment decision
of decentralized proﬁt-maximizing agents, who face investment adjustment costs in a market
with stochastic returns and a limit on aggregate investment. The model is consistent with
equilibrium models of asset princing under uncertainty but diﬀers from the mainstream as-
sumption of constant investment cost assuming that, for technological or insitutional reason,
the investment cost is constant only until an investment ceiling becomes binding. At that
point, in fact, Bartolini shows that cost becomes inﬁnite. His paper shows that a competitive
market reacts to this type of externality by generating recurrent runs as aggregate investment
approcheses its limit.
5The existence of quotas seems to be idiosyncratic with respect to various aspects of the
economic approach. Particularly, it can be used not only to migration phenomenon, by also
concerning foreign investment or also the adoption of licenses regulating the market. We can
ﬁnd many examples in which quotas assume an important role in the market. Capital controls
are often imposed to prevent a country’s net credit position from exceeding some acceptable
levels; central banks face limits on the amount of foreign reserves that can be used to enforce
an exchange rate target; ﬁrms in a fast-growing industry or in a developing economy may be
competing for extended periods for a small number of qualiﬁed managers or hightly skilled
workers; entry of ﬁrms is restricted in many industries by regulations aimed at containing
market size or by technological constraints on the use of a scarce resource. Similar approaches
arise for taxi and liquor licences, ﬁshing and costal trade rights, the number of polluting trade
permits or ecolabelling permits (Dosi and Moretto, 2001).
6The indexes from 1 to 6 were deﬁned by Fondazione Rodolfo Debenedetti (see www.frdb.org
for details) and the index 7 was deﬁned by Hatton (2004).
7"All countries except Greece, [...] denote a tightening in regulations", see Boeri and
Brücker, 2005, page 634.
8Table 1 is our elaboration by using some European immigration databases and sources.
Table 1 concerns Europe in geographical sense.
9Table 2 is our elaboration on Jachimowicz et al. (2004, pages 36-40 ) and Sunderhaus,
(2007).
10See Dixit-Pindyck (1994, pag. 253); Bartolini (1993); Moretto (2008) and Moretto and
Vergalli (2008).
11As stressed by Epstein and Nitzan (2006), "empirical evidence from the EU countries
shows that immigration had at most a very small impact on wages and employment oppor-
tunities of natives". Moreover, "most of the evidence on the eﬀect of immigrants on wages
(and employment) for the US is also ambiguous in the sense that some studies show small
positive eﬀect and others small negative eﬀects". In line with this empirical evidence we study
the migration process without taking into account the crossed eﬀect on natives’ wages and
unemployment level.
12Concerning this, see Bauer, Epstein and Gang, (2002), Epstein and Gang (2004), Moretto
18and Vergalli (2008), and Vergalli (2007).
13In other words, the reserve value u measures the level of "desperation" by the potential
immigrants.
14For details about the process, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pag. 71).
15In this case we assume that the shock is homogeneous for all immigrants. If the shock
were individual-speciﬁc, the model should change by considering the immigrants as they had
diﬀerent skills (i.e., they could perceive diﬀerent wage gaps). The result will be a change of
scale in the trigger levels and a self-selection of immigrants, but the theoretical result will
not change. For more details, see Vergalli (2007), page 12. Therefore, we use a homogeneous
shock as a general model.
16That is, the sum of the instantaneous dividend (beneﬁt) ﬂow and the expected capital
gain equals normal proﬁts (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 185).
17Where Vθ = ∂V
∂θ and Vθθ = ∂2V
∂θ2 .
18That is, the discounted present value of the beneﬁt ﬂows over an inﬁnite horizon starting
from θ (Harrison 1985, p. 44). See equation (19) in the Appendix.
19This condition is familiar in the real option theory with the name of matching value
condition (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
20See condition (23) in the Appendix.
21It is worth noting that the "utility" threshold that triggers migration for individual im-
migrants is identical to that of the individual that correctly anticipates the other immigrants’
strategies. This property, discovered ﬁrst by Leahy (1993), has an important operative impli-
cation; i.e., the optimal migration policy of each individual need not take account of the eﬀect
of rivals’ entry. He/she can behave competitively as if he/she is the last to enter. In other
words, when an individual decides to enter, by pretending to be the last to migrate, he/she is
ignoring two things: 1) He/she is thinking that his/her beneﬁt ﬂow is given by u(n)θ, with n
held ﬁxed forever. Thus, as u0(n) < 0, he/she is ignoring that future entry by other members,
in response to a higher value of θ, will reduce "utility". All things being equal, this would
make entry more attractive for the migrant that behaves myopically. 2) He/she is unaware
that the prospect of future entry by competitors reduces the option value of waiting. That is,
pretending to be the last to migrate, the individual also believes he/she still has a valuable
option of waiting before making an irreversible decision. All things being equal, this makes
the decision to enter less attractive. The two eﬀects oﬀset each other, allowing the migrant
to act as if in isolation (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 291).
22Obviuosly, a government sets the quota in line with the supply-demand gap of the labour
market. Indeed, "the selection of candidates for immigration can be made by the receiving
country itself [...] In this cases, potential immigrants are screened on the basis of certain
characteristics, deemed to contribute to, and facilitate, integration in the host country, such
as [...] having an occupation deemed to be in shortage and having a prior job oﬀer from an
employer in the host country" (Sopemi, 2006, page 114).
23The upper support of the distribution can be set to ˆ N ≤ ¯ N.Without loosing in generality
we assume that ˆ N = ¯ N.
24This due to the fact that
d β
β−1
dσ > 0 and
du(n)
dn < 0.
25We concentrate the analysis on the case of an unknown quota. Obviously, we have the
same eﬀect with known quota.
26Let us notice that limn→∞ E (B (n)) = 0 even if u(n) →u
¯
≥ 0.
27Notice that this result always holds for u
¯
> 0, but it is also true for u
¯
≥ 0 by using limit
deﬁnition. In this case for each real number ε>0 inﬁnitesimely small, there exists a value n0




) − E(H (∞)) <ε




) − 0 <ε
If ε → 0 it follows that n0 i st h er i g h tv a l u ew ea r es e a r c h i n g .
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